China’s rare earth export control exposes global supply-chain vulnerability, pushes G7 to confront single-source dependence

Rare earth elements were formed billions of years ago through cosmic processes, but their importance has never been more immediate. Once treated as a niche mineral group, rare earths now sit at the centre of the global contest for its strategic value in developing technology, clean energy, defence capability, and industrial security. And in this contest, the winner is not who owns the maximum reserves, but who is efficient in processing, refining, and turning into usable industrial inputs.
And this is where China holds its strongest advantage
China has the world’s highest identified rare earth reserves, estimated at around 44 million tonnes. But there are also the countries like Vietnam, Brazil, Canada, Russia, India, Australia, and the United States who have notable reserves of 22 million tonnes, 21 million tonnes, 15.2 million tonnes, 12 million tonnes, 6.9 million tonnes, 5.7 million tonnes, and 2.3 million tonnes, respectively. If China individually accounts for 44 to 49 per cent, Brazil and Vietnam together also account for 32-38 per cent of the world’s identified reserves.

Then, how does China stand out? The real strength is not its geology, but its processing capability, refining capacity, separation technology and magnet manufacturing. China’s role is not only limited to direct rare earth exports, rather its influence comes from the growing share of indirect or embedded within intermediate component like rare earth magnets or finished consumer products like electric vehicle motors, smartphones, and military technology. And the consumers from China are United States, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, and Vietnam.
A tonne of exported rare earth compounds is visible in trade data, but rare earths embedded inside a motor, turbine or high-performance magnet are difficult to track. According to the World Integrated Trade Solution, China’s rare earth compound exports stood at 35,304 tonnes in 2024 worth USD 377 million. The United States being the highest importer, secured 12,517 tonnes of rare earth valued at USD 104 million. Japan followed with 7,933 tonnes of imports at USD 134 miiilion. Vietnam, South Korea, and Netherland’s import values were USD 26.75 million, USD 26.26 million, and USD 20.78 million, respectively.
In 2025, China’s rare earth exports surged further even after Beijing began shipment restrictions of several medium to heavy elements from April, reaching 62,585 tonnes, showed the General Administration of Customs data. This apparent contradiction is important to understand. China says it is not banning exports but controlling. It is using export controls to manage access, delay approvals, screen buyers and create uncertainty.
Officially, China has framed the restrictions around national security, dual-use materials and non-proliferation obligations. Those explanations are not irrelevant. Rare earths do have defence and dual-use applications. So, for China, rare earths have become a counter-leverage tool at a time when it is also facing pressure from the West on semiconductors, technology access and trade policy.
This is why the G7’s rare earth agenda has gained urgency
G7 countries, including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, have come together with a pledge to ensure no single country supplies more than 60 per cent of their rare earth and permanent magnet imports by 2030. The ultimate target is to drop the reliance to 50 per cent on a single country. The objective behind this is to diversify the sourcing of metals vital to defence, technology, and renewable energy.
The talks have been ongoing since 2023 but the discussion gained momentum over a year since China declared export controls. On June 17, 2026, they planned to align stockpiling and launch a new platform with an expanded role for the International Energy Agency.
The objective is realistic as a risk-reduction goal, but not as a quick replacement strategy. Among all the G7 countries, only Canada and the US have rare earth reserves of 15.2 million tonnes and 2.3 million tonnes. Other G7 countries like Japan and the EU are the leading consumers of rare earth elements, driven by advanced electronics manufacturing, automotive, robotics, and clean energy.
Here’s how Japan has established diversified sourcing
According to IMARC Group, the market valuation of rare earth in Japan reached an estimated USD 830 million. No, not China alone took care of this market growth since Japan changed its approach to supply chain resiliency and built a diversified pool of investments into non-China rare earth projects. Since, China implemented an export ban on rare earths targeting Tokyo in 2010, Japan reduced its dependence on Chinese rare earth elements from 90 per cent to 60 per cent, which is now the objective set by G7 countries.
So, who takes care of Japan’s rare earth requirements? Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths Limited, where Japan has its investment, and its processing plant in Malaysia. Japan also has diplomatic and resource-sharing agreement with India and Kazakhstan. Japan itself has a semi-infinite trove of rare earths that can last the world for years and significantly cut into China’s dominance. Island of Minamitorishima has a vast deposit of 16 million tonnes of high-quality rare-earths but the snag is its high cost and difficulty to mine because of the deep depths of the sea.
Key takeaway is Japan has not removed China completely from the equation but reduced the risk to a manageable level by diversifying sources.
The European Union faces a deeper challenge
The European Union is a major consumer of rare earth, but it has limited domestic production. Hence, the region imports 12,900 tonnes of rare earth elements each year, with the majority coming from China and Russia, according to the data revealed by the European Commission. By 2030, rare earth demand in the EU is expected to grow sixfold and that by 2050 sevenfold.
So, the European Union’s response is built around diversification, recycling, and regulation. Through the European Critical Raw Materials Act, the EU aims to diversify and secure supplies – even by obtaining 25 per cent of the materials through recycling. The project LIFE INSPIREE is developing a way to extract, for the first time in Europe at large scale, rare earth metals from the magnets inside computer hard disk drives, electric motors, household appliances and other electronic waste. The project aims to scale up an industrial process to recover up to 700 tonnes of valuable rare earth elements like neodymium, palladium and dysprosium. Through this way, the EU can curb its reliance on China.
But for now, the European Union, particularly Germany, is grappling with supply chain crisis with China’s export curbs, who has been the largest exporter of REEs to the EU. Hence, the latter is looking for a reliable alternative source. Arafura’s Nolans Project in Australia’s Northern Territory is emerging as one such option. The project is expected to produce around 4,440 tonnes of neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr) oxide annually from late 2029, which will partially offset the shortage from China as it exported close to 6,000 tonnes annually till 2024. From Russia, the EU imports a little more than 3,500 tonnes.
The US gradually leveraging its capacity
The United States faces perhaps the most revealing contradiction. It was once a dominant force in the global rare earth market and held a monopoly till the 1980s with a single flagship mine in Mountain Pass, California. But it eventually became dependent on China after losing the infrastructure for mining and producing REEs. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the US produced 15,000 tonnes of REE annually compared with 5,000 tonnes of production across the rest of the world. While the US REE production declined, China’s output rose as it invested in considerable resources to develop the technologies and mine infrastructure necessary to extract and refine from domestic sources. From 1985 to 1995, China's annual REE mining production leaped from 8500 tonnes to almost 50,000 tonnes, and its share of global mining output increased from 21 per cent to 60 per cent.
Nonetheless, in 2025, the US still stood as the second-largest producer of rare earth globally by churning out 8,900 tonnes versus 4,300 tonnes in 2024. In parallel, its reliance on imports also increased to 67 per cent. Heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium remain 100 per cent import-dependent. The real challenge is its incapability of downstream separation, metal making, and magnet manufacturing – the areas in which China devoted considerable resources to develop technologies and refining infrastructure.
The increasing dependence on China for rare earth led to the United States’ import volumes of 10,400 tonnes in 2025, meeting 67 per cent of the United States’ consumption. Notably, 70 per cent of this volume came from China even after trade restrictions. Malaysia, Japan, Estonia, and other sources contribute to the United States rare earth supply chain, accounting for 13 per cent, 6 per cent, 5 per cent, and 6 per cent, respectively.
Now, if the objective is to cut dependence to 60-50 per cent on one single country, then the United States will have to look for alternative sources instead of China to replenish the remaining 20-10 per cent. The researchers, led by U-M scientists Stephen Kesler and Greg Keoleian found 28 rare earth sites in North America contain enough rare earth elements to produce more than the US needs for the next few decades, but only some of them can be mined economically.
“Environmentally, we don’t want to do any more mining than necessary, and if you have too much production, then the price drops and everyone goes out of business. This is a situation in which a little bit of government oversight in terms of funding and encouragement can help to develop a stable industry,” said Kesler, professor emeritus in the U-M Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences.
However, the bottomline is, according to Kesler and Keoleian, the deposits are close enough in quality to be able to support a domestic supply chain with a little government support. The advantage is North America has the deposits of both light and heavy rare earth elements. While the former has excellent magnetic properties, the latter improves magnet stability at high temperatures. The United States contains mostly the light rare earths and Canada possesses heavy elements.
The United States has also started investing in forming strong domestic supply chains of rare earth magnets. The US Department of Defense (DOD) is investing USD 400 million for a 15 per cent stake in the California rare earth company MP Materials and is also issueing a loan of USD 150 million to help MP build a heavy rare earth separation plant in California. Using the funding and the loan, MP plans to build a plant to make 10,000 tonnes of rare earth magnets per year. Production is set to begin from 2028.
USA Rare Earth will also invest USD 1.2 billion with the support of the US Department of Commerce’s CHIPS program to establish a magnet manufacturing and refined metal operations in Blacksburg, South Carolina. It is also targeting 2028 for commissioning. On the other hand, Noveon Magnetics has raised USD 215 million in funding from private equity to scale production to 2,000 tonnes of magnets annually.
Summing up
Reducing China’s share from 70-80 per cent to 60 per cent would hence be possible with coordinated investment, stockpiling, offtake agreements, recycling and allied sourcing. Bringing it down to 50 per cent will be the next level challenge. The problem is not only supply. It is cost competitiveness. China’s rare earth ecosystem is efficient because it is integrated. Mining, refining, separation, alloy production, magnet manufacturing and end-use industries are closely connected. Alternative supply chains in the US, Europe, Japan, Australia and Canada will likely be more expensive in the early years.
That means governments will have to support the sector through funding, long-term procurement, defence contracts, tax incentives and strategic stockpiles. Without stable demand and policy backing, new projects could struggle to survive price cycles.
The central lesson is clear: China’s rare earth advantage was built over decades, and it cannot be dismantled quickly. The West’s goal should not be to pretend that China can be replaced overnight. That is unrealistic. The practical goal is to remove the single-source vulnerability.
Rare earths are no longer just an industrial input. They are a geopolitical pressure point. China understands this. The G7 now understands it too. The race ahead is not only about finding more rare earth deposits. It is about building the processing, refining and manufacturing systems needed to turn those deposits into power.
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